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Abstract 
 
 
Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise.  In 
particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and 
artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point.  
However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major 
ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is 
holistic or analytic.  Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses.  In this paper, 
we show how, with some additions, a recent theory of expert memory (the template 
theory) offers a coherent and wide-ranging explanation of intuition in expert 
behaviour.  It is shown that the theory accounts for the key features of intuition: it 
explains the rapid onset of intuition and its perceptual nature, provides mechanisms 
for learning, incorporates processes showing how perception is linked to action and 
emotion, and how experts capture the entirety of a situation.  In doing so, the new 
theory addresses the issues problematic for Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories.  
Implications for research and practice are discussed. 
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Expertise and Intuition: A tale of three theories 
One of the hallmarks of expertise is the speed and ease with which experts can 
recognize the key features of a situation, a phenomenon often called intuition.1  For 
example, a radiologist can diagnose a disease nearly instantaneously, and a chess 
grandmaster can literally ‘see’ the good move straight away.  With routine problems, 
the decision will be correct most of the time.  This phenomenon has attracted wide 
attention in the literature, which has been dominated by two main theories.  On the 
one side, authors such as Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 1972; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1988)  
have argued that intuition is a signature of the holistic processing of the brain and the 
mind.2  On the other side, authors such as Herbert Simon (Chase & Simon, 1973; 
Simon, 1989) have proposed that simple mechanisms, based on pattern recognition, 
are sufficient for explaining intuition.  In spite of these differences, it is important to 
note that Dreyfus and Simon agreed on many aspects of intuition: its speed, its 
fluidity, the fact that it takes a large amount of practice for a novice to reach expert 
level and thus show intuitive behaviour, and the fact that perceptual processes lie at 
the core of intuition.  This level of agreement is rather ironic—and often ignored in 
the literature—given that these two scholars were at the centre of a bitter dispute as to 
whether artificial intelligence (AI) was myth or reality, the use of symbols in human 
cognition, and the importance of heuristics in decision making. 
                                                 
1
 In line with the literature, we use intuition for the rapid understanding shown by individuals, typically 
experts, when they face a problem, and insight for the sudden discovery of a solution after a protracted 
and unsuccessful search.  While this article focuses on intuition, several of the theories we discuss have 
been applied to explain insight as well. 
2
 As the authors made a number of corrections, we use the 1988 edition of Mind Over Machine rather 
than the 1986 edition. 
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 The goal of this article is to evaluate these two theories empirically and then to 
present a new theory of intuition that removes their limitations.  We first present the 
empirical evidence supporting the psychological reality of the concept of intuition, 
then we discuss Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories in detail.  The identification of the 
strengths and weaknesses of these two theories leads to the presentation of a new 
theory of intuition based on the template theory of expertise (Gobet & Simon, 1996c, 
2000).  The final section highlights how the new theory addresses the deficiencies of 
the earlier theories. 
Empirical Evidence Supporting the Concept of Intuition 
A fair amount of the evidence in the literature on intuition is anecdotal, and it 
is important to establish the experimental validity of the phenomenon before engaging 
in a discussion of the merits of the candidate theories.  Without any doubt, the domain 
providing most experimental data is chess.   
There is good evidence that strong players search the problem space 
selectively, homing in rapidly on the important moves.  Klein, Wolf, Militello, and 
Zsambok (1995) found that the first move generated by players was usually good 
enough, a result that has been recently replicated in handball (Johnson & Raab, 2003).  
Campitelli and Gobet (2004)  found that a chess grandmaster was able to correctly 
solve nearly 50% of problem situations within 10 s, compared to less than 5% for a 
weak club player.  It has also been shown that performance in speed chess, where 
there is only about 5 s per move on average, shares 81% of the variance with the 
ratings based on standard chess, where players have about 180 s per move on average 
(Burns, 2004).  The skill effect with briefly-presented chess positions (Chase & 
Simon, 1973; De Groot, 1965) can also be seen as a signature of intuition, in 
particular when one considers that masters show nearly perfect recall with a 
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presentation as short as 5 s and that, even though their task is to memorise the 
position, they also understand its meaning fairly well at the end of the presentation.  
In addition, eye-movement recordings during the brief presentation of the position 
show that masters typically look rapidly at the key elements (De Groot & Gobet, 
1996). 
Empirical support for the role of intuition exists in other domains as well.  
Thinking-aloud protocols with physics experts (Larkin, Mc Dermott, Simon, & 
Simon, 1980) show that they can solve routine problems in a matter of seconds.  Fire-
fighter commanders facing high-risk situations use intuition to make decisions under 
considerable time pressure (Klein, 1998).  In many cases, they quickly adopt the 
appropriate behaviour without even considering alternatives.  A similar type of 
behaviour has been reported by other experts, including battle commanders (Klein, 
1998), managers (Patton, 2003), and intensive-care nurses (Benner, Tanner, & Chesla, 
1996; Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993). 
Dreyfus’s Theory of Expertise and Intuition 
In his book What Computers Can’t Do Dreyfus (1972) developed a wide-
ranging critique of the symbolic approach in artificial intelligence, as exemplified for 
example by the work of Newell and Simon (1972), Minsky (1977), and McCarthy 
(1968).  One key argument in Dreyfus’s critique was that human cognition is 
embodied, situated, and experiential.  Another key argument was that, in contradiction 
to classical artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, humans do not use 
symbols, but perceive their environment and make decisions using holistic processes.  
In particular, holistic processing is characteristic of individuals that are experts in a 
domain.  Dreyfus, a philosopher, was more interested in providing a critique of AI 
  6 
based on phenomenology than in offering a detailed scientific theory, and did not 
develop his view in great detail, nor support it by experimental data. 
 In another influential book, Dreyfus (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1988) elaborated 
this view and described the steps that the aspiring expert has to go through (see also 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1984; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1996, 2005).  In the “novice” stage, 
information is acquired through instruction; domain-specific facts, features, and 
actions are learnt.  Rules are “context-free,” in the sense that their application ignores 
what else is happening in the environment.  The “advanced beginner” stage is attained 
only after substantial concrete experience with the domain.  Situational elements—
that is, elements that depend on the context—become meaningful and are used.  In the 
“competence” stage, decision-making procedures are organised hierarchically.  While 
this stage is characterized by an increased level of efficiency, planning is still to a 
considerable extent conscious and deliberate.  In the “proficiency” stage, certain 
features will be perceived as salient while others will be ignored.  Proficient 
individuals, while able to “intuitively organize and understand” the problem 
situations, still use analytical thinking to decide what to do next.  In the final, 
“expertise” stage, both understanding of the task and deciding what to do is intuitive 
and fluid.  In routine situations, “experts don’t solve problems and don’t make 
decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1988, pp. 30-31).  
Dreyfus and Dreyfus use mostly anecdotal evidence and references to the reader’s 
experience to buttress their theory.  In the domain of nursing, Benner and her 
colleagues (Benner, 1984) offer some direct empirical support in favour of the theory, 
based on group interviews, detailed observations, and intensive personal history 
interviews.  (See Gobet & Chassy (in press) for a discussion of nursing expertise in 
the light of some of the ideas discussed in the present article.) 
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 Dreyfus and Dreyfus have considered three ways in which the brain could 
produce intuitive behaviour based on experiences.  In the first edition of Mind over 
Machine, they speculated that the brain could be seen as a holographic pattern 
recognizer.  This idea was dismissed in the preface of the second edition of the book.  
Instead, these authors considered the possibility of using the mechanisms proposed by 
neural net research.  This possibility was in turn dismissed in the preface of the 1992 
editions of What Computers Still Can’t Do: “It looks likely that the neglected and then 
revived connectionist approach is merely getting its deserved chance to fail” (Dreyfus, 
1992, p. xxxviii).  The final possibility considered was the approach of reinforcement 
learning (e.g., Tesauro, 1992), but it was concluded that this approach also met with 
serious practical and theoretical problems (Dreyfus, 1992), although S. E. Dreyfus 
(2004) provides a more optimistic evaluation. 
 While we have centred on Dreyfus’s approach, we should mention that other 
authors have emphasized that intuition requires holistic processing.  For example, for 
chess, the domain discussed at length by Dreyfus (1972) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1988), one can mention the proposals by De Groot (1986; see also De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996, for an extended discussion of De Groot's view) and Linhares (2005).  At 
the descriptive level, the theory is in line with cognitive theories proposing that 
novices start with verbal, analytic knowledge and slowly move to levels where 
knowledge becomes unconscious (Anderson, 1982; Cleveland, 1907).   
Although Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s account has face value validity, it also 
conflicts with a fair amount of empirical data.  First, there is evidence that, in many 
domains, expertise does not imply a decrease of abstract thought and a concomitant 
increase in concrete thought, as proposed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus.  One of the best 
examples is physics, where experts in fact solve problems at a deep, abstract level, 
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while novices perform at a superficial, concrete level (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; 
Larkin et al., 1980).   
Second, the presence of stages in expertise development is poorly 
documented.  In addition to the well known difficulty of empirically establishing the 
reality of stages (van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992), there is clear evidence that 
individuals may be experts in one sub-field whilst performing less fluidly in another 
sub-field of the same domain (Benner, 1984; Gruber & Strube, 1989; Rikers et al., 
2002).  Although Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) acknowledge that the level of expertise 
of one individual may vary for different problems with the same area, this would 
suggest that the notion of stage must not be taken literally, but only suggestively.  But 
this seems to undermine one of the main theoretical contributions of the model. 
Third, a tenet of the theory, and of Dreyfus’s earlier work, is that intuition is 
necessary for performing at expert level in what Dreyfus (1972) calls “complex 
formal” and “nonformal” intelligent activities and that, being analytic, heuristic-
search computer programs cannot reach this level of performance (Dreyfus, 1972; 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1988, e.g., Table 1.1; , 2005).  (This is discussed in detail in the 
conclusion chapter of What Computers Can’t Do (Dreyfus, 1972); see in particular 
the discussion surrounding Table 1 in the Conclusion chapter.) Recent developments 
in computer board games, for example in chess where world champion Kasparov was 
beaten by Deep Blue (Campbell, Hoane, & Hsu, 2002)3 and in Othello where world 
champion Murakami was beaten by Logistello (Buro, 1999), show that programs 
                                                 
3
 There has been some (unsubstantiated, in our view) suggestion that Deep Blue received unfair help 
from its programmers.  However, more recent matches pitting world champions against computer 
programmes running on standard PCs have consistently demonstrated that the best human players 
struggle against computers (see for example the 4-2 defeat of world champion Vladimir Kramnik 
against Deep Fritz in December 2006). 
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using heuristic search—without any holistic understanding of positions—can perform 
at very high levels (see also Strom & Darden, 1996, for a similar point).  Indeed, 
chess grandmasters are often baffled by how their intuitions can be proven false by 
commercially-available computer programs.4  
 It could actually be the case that computer programs may help develop a 
much better understanding of chess than humans have been able to achieve (Gobet, 
1993).  Jansen (1992; , 1992) compared human play with endgame databases and 
found that even grandmasters perform weakly in simple endings.  Consider the 
endgame King-Queen vs. King-Rook, an endgame that textbooks consider as 
elementary and to which they devote just a few pages.  Jansen found that even world-
class grandmasters made so many errors that it took, on average, four times longer 
than the optimal line of play to win the game.  In many cases, they would have 
achieved only a draw instead of a win. 
Fourth, while Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) recognize that even individuals at 
the expert level may need to carry out analytic problem solving, they do not supply 
details about how the information provided by holistic intuition may be used, for 
example, to guide look-ahead search in a game such as chess.  In addition, the role of 
conscious problem solving is clearly underestimated in the theory.  Based on an 
informal experiment with a chess international master who “more than held his own” 
against “a slightly weaker, but master level, player” in spite of having to add dictated 
numbers, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988, p. 33) conclude that players at the expert stage 
                                                 
4
 A good example of this is the last game of the match Kramnik vs. Deep Fritz, mentioned in the 
previous footnote, where a series of Deep Fritz’s manoeuvres that grandmasters commenting on the 
game originally found primitive and naïve turned out to have deep strategic implications. Deep Fritz 
won the game. 
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can still produce “fluid and coordinated play” in spite of being “deprived of the time 
necessary to see problems and construct plans.”  Unfortunately, not enough details are 
provided in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s book to evaluate this experiment; in particular, it is 
unclear as to the difference in skill between the two players, whether there were 
behavioural differences between normal play and play with the interfering task, and, 
indeed, to what extent the second player was affected by the experimental setting.  
Well-controlled experiments with large samples (Robbins et al., 1995) have shown 
that a concurrent task interfering with what Baddeley (1986) calls the central 
executive substantially impairs the quality of the moves chosen.  Robbins et al. used 
tactical chess positions, and one could argue that Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s point was 
that their master won his game solely through intuitive strategic play (roughly, 
position estimation and long-range planning), without using tactical play (roughly, 
short-term precise calculations based on thinking ahead).  This seems unlikely to us, 
as nearly every game at master level contains moments where tactics become crucial.  
In addition, recent research (Chabris & Hearst, 2003; Gobet & Simon, 1996b) has 
clearly established that reducing thinking decreases playing skill, although one should 
emphasise that the level of play with grandmasters is still fairly high, and thus that 
some kind of pattern recognition must be involved.  Thus, our disagreement is not 
about the importance of intuitive play at expert level, but about Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s 
neglect of analytical thinking—in chess, look-ahead search. 
Finally, evidence from neuroscience does not support the notion of holistic 
pattern recognition.  There is now good evidence that perception proceeds 
sequentially, engaging specialized modules, as is shown for example by Eimer (2000) 
for data on face perception and O’Rourke and Holcomb (2002) for data on word 
perception. 
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Simon’s Standard Theories of Expertise and Intuition 
While Dreyfus’s approach is philosophical and the evidence used to support it 
mostly anecdotal, Simon’s emphasis is on mechanistic explanations of empirical 
phenomena, with direct recourse to experimental data.  The starting point of Simon’s 
analysis is that experts suffer from the same cognitive limits as novices (Chase & 
Simon, 1973).  In particular, they can pay attention to only one thing at a time, and 
their short-term memory (STM) is limited to just a few items.  In addition, experts 
essentially use the same problem solving methods as novices, such as means-end 
analysis, progressive deepening, and use of heuristics to cut the search space down.  
What happens during the path from novice to expert is that individuals learn a large 
number of perceptual patterns that get associated with possible actions; in other 
words, they learn a large number of “productions” (i.e., condition-action pairs; Chase 
& Simon, 1973; Newell & Simon, 1972).  For example, a chess player may learn that, 
given a certain king’s side pawn structure, an attack including the sacrifice of a bishop 
should be considered.  This chunking process is not unique to expertise, but is one 
basic learning mechanism found in other domains, such as verbal learning (Simon & 
Feigenbaum, 1964).  Intuition can then be explained by the firing of a production: a 
pattern similar to one learned during previous experience is recognized, and thus a 
solution is automatically accessed (see Fig. 1).5  While this solution was obtained 
through slow problem solving mechanisms in the first instance, it is now accessed 
automatically by memory lookup.  To some extent, within Simon’s framework, 
intuition is just one method among others to reduce the search space.    
 
                                                 
5
 Note that the proposed move is not necessarily the best one in a specific context—just a move that is 
often good in similar contexts. In the example of F
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 While Simon sometimes relied on anecdotal evidence, he also used a number 
of experimental data to support this explanation of intuition.  Data from chess (Chase 
& Simon, 1973) show that strong players perceive the board as chunks of pieces, and 
not as individual pieces, and also that they chunk sequences of moves.  The chunking 
of actions (moves) is also apparent in learning simple puzzles such as the tower of 
Hanoi (Anzai & Simon, 1979).  Data from physics clearly show that experts can 
recognize the solution of routine problems almost instantly and that, at least with 
routine problems, as expertise develops the search strategy changes from backward 
search to forward search or even forward execution—that is, proceeds through the 
solution with minimal search (Larkin et al., 1980). 
Another source of support for Simon’s theory comes from computer 
simulations, which establish that the mechanisms postulated by the theory are 
sufficient to produce the behaviour to explain.  Relevant simulations, using 
production systems, include modelling how a novice becomes proficient in solving 
the tower of Hanoi (Anzai & Simon, 1979) and how backwards search is replaced by 
forward search as novices become experts in physics (Larkin et al., 1980).  Indirect 
support is also offered by simulations of memory recall tasks showing how chunks—
an essential component of pattern recognition and thus of intuition—are acquired in 
chess (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973). 
In line with Simon’s views, a number of theories explain intuition as 
recognition of perceptual patterns linked to actions, which compile domain-specific 
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experience acquired over years of practice and study.  Among the most influential, 
one can mention those of Newell (1990), Saariluoma (1995), and Klein (2003). 
Simon’s theory of intuition has been criticized on several grounds.  Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus (1988) note that, as chess positions are comprised of several chunks, 
several moves will be proposed; however, there is no provision of mechanisms 
explaining how only one move is selected.  In addition, the types of chunk proposed 
by Simon are defined in isolation to other aspects of the situation.  By contrast, 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988, p. 210) argue that the position is stored as “an 
unanalyzable whole.”  They also criticize Simon’s “information processing 
assumption that intelligence consists in drawing conclusions using features and rules,” 
noting that high levels of expertise “are characterized by a rapid, fluid, involved kind 
of behavior that bears no apparent similarity to the slow, detached reasoning of the 
problem-solving process” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1988, p. 27).6  De Groot (1986) argues 
that intuition is more than pattern recognition, emphasising its constructive and 
productive aspects.  That is, intuition does not only reproduce previous solutions, but 
creatively combines elements to produce new solutions.  
Holding (1985) provides additional criticisms, more aimed at Simon’s general 
theory of expertise than at his theory of intuition in particular.  Two of these criticisms 
are especially important theoretically: encoding into long-term memory (LTM) is 
faster than proposed by the chunking theory, and the size of chunks is too small to 
reflect conceptual knowledge and provide useful information in problem-solving 
situations.  A third criticism—that pattern recognition is not a sufficient explanation 
of skill, because it applies only to the initial problem situation and does not link to 
                                                 
6
 But note that this criticism appears to ignore Simon’s work on chunking and pattern recognition (e.g., 
Chase & Simon, 1973). 
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look-ahead analysis—is much weaker, as Chase and Simon (1973) made it clear that 
pattern recognition occurs not only in the initial problem situation, but also in the 
problem states generated during look-ahead search. 
To these criticisms, we can add that, while Simon’s computer models were 
remarkable and insightful in their own right, they either failed to reach high levels of 
expertise or did so only with considerable hand-coded knowledge but no real learning.  
Finally, the links between intuition and emotions are not spelled out in any detail.  
A New Theory of Intuition 
Our discussion of Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories has highlighted the features 
that a successful theory of expert intuition should have: it should explain the rapid 
onset of intuition and its links with emotion, provide mechanisms for learning, have 
processes showing how perception is linked to action, and explain how experts 
capture the entirety of a situation.  In this section, we develop such a theory, taking as 
basis the template theory of memory developed by Gobet and Simon (Gobet & 
Simon, 1996c, 2000).  
The template theory was developed to correct a number of weaknesses of the 
chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973), of which it is a modification and extension.  
These include the fact that players use larger chunks that those proposed by the 
chunking theory, the failure of Simon and Gilmartin’s (1973) computer simulations of 
memory recall to reach master level and the fact that the chunks learnt were pre-
selected by the programmers, and weaknesses in the way PERCEIVER (Simon & 
Barenfeld, 1969) accounted for chess players’ eye movements.  Aspects of the 
template theory are implemented in a computer program known as CHREST (Chunk 
Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures) (Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003), 
and the fact that CHREST simulates not only the phenomena tackled by Simon and 
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Gilmartin’s (1973) and Simon and Barenfeld (1973), but also a substantial number of 
new phenomena (see section “Simulations with the CHREST model” below) clearly 
shows that the weaknesses of the earlier programs have indeed been corrected in the 
new theory without inadvertently creating new problems.  
Overview of the Theory 
We carefully distinguish between the features of the template theory that have 
been implemented in CHREST and in other programs,7 those that are part of the 
theory but have not been implemented yet, and those that we have added to the theory 
to account for the link between intuition and emotions. 
The CHREST model. 
Components.  Like the original chunking theory, template theory proposes that 
expertise is made possible by the acquisition of a large number of chunks, some of 
which are linked to possible actions.  A key addition of template theory is the 
assumption that some patterns that recur often in the environment give rise to chunks 
that develop into more complex data structures called templates.  Templates are 
similar to schemata (Bartlett, 1932; Minsky, 1975) in that they possess both a core, 
made of stable information, and slots, made of variable information.  Unlike previous 
schema theories, template theory proposes detailed mechanisms as to how 
templates—both their core and their slots—are acquired (see below).  
In CHREST, chunks and templates (which are a special case of chunks) are 
indexed by a discrimination network (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973), which consists of a 
network of sequential tests enabling the access to information in LTM.8  While 
                                                 
7
 The code of these programs (in Lisp) is available from the first author. 
8
 Neurally, it has been proposed that chunks and templates are implemented as cell assemblies (Chassy 
& Gobet, 2005). 
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learning is assumed to be slow (e.g., 10 s to create a new chunk), access of chunks by 
sorting the discrimination network is assumed to lead to fast recognition of objects (a 
few hundred milliseconds). 
Chunks may be connected by similarity links if they have enough elements in 
common.  In addition to the discrimination net, the model has three components: an 
LTM, a visual STM, and a “mind’s eye.” LTM contains chunks, productions and 
schemata.  Visual STM has a capacity of three chunks.  It is a queue, meaning that, 
when a new chunk enters STM where it is already full, the oldest chunk “pops out” 
from STM.  The exception is that the largest chunk is kept in STM until a larger 
chunk is met.  Templates, which have slots in which variable information can be 
stored, are a special type of chunk.  Finally, the mind’s eye stores visuo-spatial 
information for a short time; it is the place where, for example, the trajectories of 
pieces are computed.  The main mechanisms used by CHREST deal with eye 
fixations, STM management, LTM learning, and information update in the mind’s 
eye.  In general, it is assumed that humans are conscious of the information held in 
STM and in the mind’s eye, but not of the information and processes used during 
learning and recognition. 
While CHREST has been applied to other domains (Gobet et al., 2001), we 
focus on chess in the explanations that follow, not only because this domain provides 
some the best evidence for intuition (see above), but also because both Dreyfus and 
Simon heavily refer to chess in their theory of intuition. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Fig. 2 illustrates the main components of the theory, with chess as the task 
environment.  A simulated eye scans the board, and the information within the visual 
field is input to the discrimination network, which leads to the access of a certain node 
in LTM.  A pointer to this node is placed in short-term memory, and the information 
is also unpacked in pictorial short-term memory (the “mind’s eye”).9 This sequence of 
operations is assumed to be repeated when players look at a position. 
Eye fixations.  CHREST’s attention is directed by eye movements.  The 
program attempts to use information provided by the largest chunk met at any given 
point to fixate a location.  In chess, this operation is performed by following a branch 
that is stored below the chunk and fixating the square associated with this branch.  As 
an example, let us assume that this is the chunk depicted in grey in Fig. 3.  CHREST 
would take the link leading to the most recently created node (in our example, “white 
pawn on f2”), and fixate on the square indicated by this link, in this case the square f2.  
If a white pawn is indeed located on f2, then a larger chunk has been found, and thus 
more information retrieved from LTM.  Although this guess, informed by experience, 
may sometimes be incorrect, it tends to produce eye movements that are similar to 
those of experts.  For example, it is this mechanism that leads the program to fixate on 
semantically-important squares in a proportion similar to experts’ (see De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996, for details).   
If it is not possible to use this eye-movement mechanism based on knowledge 
(for example, because there is no branch in the discrimination net below the largest 
                                                 
9
 Neurally, such pointers might be implemented by short-term memory neurons in the prefrontal cortex 
firing in synchrony with neurons in posterior areas of the brain; the limited capacity of STM—that is, 
the limited number of pointers that can be held in STM—is then a function of the number of distinct 
frequencies available (Ruchkin, Grafman, Cameron, & Berndt, 2003). 
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chunk), the program draws on alternative mechanisms such as fixation on a 
perceptually salient object or on a region of the display that has not been visited yet 
(see De Groot & Gobet, 1996).  Whereas novices’ eye movements are mainly directed 
by such heuristics, most experts’ eye movements use the first mechanism and are 
directed by the structure of the discrimination network.  An interesting feature of the 
theory is thus that it includes mechanisms detailing how perception determines what 
will be learned, on the one hand, and how learned knowledge determines what will be 
perceived, on the other.   
Learning chunks and creating templates.  After each new fixation, the model 
filters the information in the visual field through the discrimination net.  In the chess 
simulations, the field of vision is limited to two squares away from the fixation point 
in each direction, so that a maximum of 25 squares can be perceived at any time (see 
De Groot & Gobet, 1996, for empirical data supporting this choice).  An external 
pattern is encoded as a list of the pieces on their squares; for example, in Fig. 2, the 
pattern on the right of the position would be encoded as: (f2, g2, h2, g1, 
e2, f4).  
Two learning mechanisms are used, familiarisation and discrimination.  When 
a new (external) object is perceived, it is sorted through the discrimination net.  When 
a node is reached, the object is compared with the information stored with this node, 
which is known as the “image.” If the image under-represents the object, new features 
are added to the image (familiarisation).  If there is a mismatch between the 
information in the image and the object, a new node is created below the current node 
by recursively adding to it some of the mismatching information (discrimination).  
CHREST also creates “similarity links” between nodes and templates.  Each chunk 
arriving into STM is compared with the largest chunk already stored there.  When the 
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two chunks are sufficiently similar, a similarity link is created between them.  During 
the recognition phase, a similarity link can be used to move from the node reached by 
sorting to another similar node.  
Templates are chunks that possess at least one slot where variable information 
can be stored.  Template slots are created when enough nodes share related 
information below a node that is sufficiently large.10 Fig. 3 illustrates this mechanism 
for the domain of chess.  There are four nodes below the node depicted in grey; the 
information “white pawn” occurs three times, and the information “square e4” occurs 
twice.  In this simplified example, we assume that the minimum number of 
occurrences is two, and thus slots are created.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Time parameters.   Each process has a time cost, which enables precise and 
quantitative simulations to be carried out.  For example, the discrimination process, 
whereby a new node (and a branch leading to it) is added in the discrimination net, 
takes 8 s, and the familiarisation process, whereby information is added to an extant 
chunk, takes 2 s.  Filling a template slot is faster and takes 250 msec.  A full 
discussion of the time parameters in CHREST is provided by De Groot and Gobet 
(1996) and Gobet and Simon (2000).  
Learning phase.  Using the mechanisms just described, CHREST learns 
chunks and templates by scanning a large database of positions taken from master 
                                                 
10
 In the chess simulations, the requirement is that the target node contains at least five elements and 
that at least three nodes below that node share identical information (either a square, a type of piece, or 
a chunk) (Gobet & Simon, 2000). 
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games, moving its simulated eye around the board, and sorting the pieces within its 
visual field through the discrimination network.  Thus, learning is implicit, 
incremental and unsupervised, and it essentially captures the regularities of the 
environment without producing a statistical representation. 
Simulation of memory experiments.  During the presentation of a position, 
CHREST fixates on squares using the eye movement mechanisms described above.  
Each fixation defines a visual field (see above), and the pieces belonging to this visual 
field are sorted through the discrimination net.  If a chunk (a pattern already familiar 
to the discrimination net) is found, a pointer to it is placed in STM, or, when possible, 
the chunk is used to fill one slot of a template.  If the presentation time is long 
enough, the program learns using the mechanisms described above.  
During the reconstruction of a position, CHREST first draws on the 
information stored in STM, and then information stored in LTM.  Pieces are placed 
sequentially.  If a piece has already been replaced on the board from a previous 
chunk, it is ignored.  Conflicts can occasionally occur: for example, a square 
containing several pieces.  Such conflicts are resolved sequentially, making use of the 
frequency with which each placement is suggested.  It is therefore possible for the 
program to “change its mind” about the location of a piece or the contents of a square 
(see example in the appendix), and so do human players.  
Extensions of CHREST for problem solving. 
The idea that the recognition of patterns of chess piece allows for the 
accessing of information about good moves is embodied in CHUMP (CHUnks and 
Moves Patterns; Gobet & Jansen, 1994), a variant of CHREST.  CHUMP stores two 
types of knowledge in two different but linked discrimination nets. The first relates to 
patterns of pieces (the type of chunks learned by CHREST).  The second relates to 
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moves and sequences of moves. During learning, where positions from master games 
are presented, patterns of pieces are associated with moves.  During the performance 
phase, patterns of pieces act as conditions, and moves as actions.  When the 
recognized piece patterns suggest different moves, the program resolves the conflict 
by using a function that combines the number of chunks voting for a given move and 
the number of times the move has been seen with a given pattern during learning.  
The program could play chess by pure pattern recognition, but its lack of look-ahead 
abilities meant that its level of play was low.  Another limitation of CHUMP is that it 
learns only a small part of the knowledge that chess experts presumably encode as 
productions.  The literature on chess skill (e.g., Gobet, de Voogt, & Retschitzki, 2004) 
suggests that chess experts have other productions where the conditions consist of 
nodes containing information such as positional concepts, tactical features, etc., while 
the nodes denoting actions encode information such as plans, heuristics, tactical 
tricks, etc.  
 A stochastic model, SEARCH (Gobet, 1997) puts together several 
mechanisms that are proposed by the template theory but not implemented in 
CHREST.  Unlike CHREST, the model does not carry out the detail of the postulated 
processes, but computes key measures, such as depth of search or the number of 
moves searched per minute, as a function of the number of chunks and templates.  
SEARCH explicitly combines pattern recognition, search, and mental imagery.  It also 
includes assumptions about the time needed for cognitive operations, as well as 
assumptions about the “fuzziness” of the images kept in the mind’s eye.  Chunks and 
templates favour deeper search, because they suggest potential moves automatically 
(templates also facilitate long-term memory encoding, maintenance of information in 
the mind’s eye, and more abstract search).  On the other hand, these memory 
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structures favour shorter search, as they provide powerful evaluations that cut down 
the need for search.  The net product, as shown in computer simulations, is that 
average depth of search follows a power function of skill—a prediction consistent 
with the data.   
Adding emotions to the template theory. 
Starting with De Groot (1965), researchers have often emphasized the role of 
emotion for intuition (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Benner, 1984), 
but this is a feature that was not covered in any detail by the chunking theory, 
Dreyfus’s theory, nor the original version of the template theory.  One important 
contribution of the current article is to show how the template theory can be extended 
to include emotions and to speculate on the biological basis of this link.  The available 
evidence supports the view that a link associates simple cognitions and simple 
emotional responses (LeDoux, 1999).  Similarly, there is evidence that complex 
representations, stored in the inferior temporal cortex, are associated to neural nets 
coding for reward (Rolls, 2003), and that such neural networks underlie the automatic 
retrieval of emotional responses (Panksepp, 1998).  Cognitions, whether simple or 
complex, are thus associated with emotional responses.  We propose that, during the 
activities taking place in the practice and study of a domain, chunks and templates 
become associated to emotional responses.  Later, when a chunk or a template is 
retrieved from LTM, it may activate one or several emotional responses.  These 
responses are analysed by an emotional processor that determines what emotional 
response is to be given priority.  The emotional processor not only triggers the body 
changes but also instigates modulation of cognitive processing.  It is worth noting that 
emotional responses, and thus cognitive modulation, are submitted to huge personal 
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variability, known as affective style (Davidson & Irwin, 1999), which may be partly 
explained by different  histories of learning crystallised in LTM structures.   
Similar to what has been shown with emotional conditioning, we propose that 
chunks are associated to emotional responses by hebbian learning. For example, in an 
adversarial game like chess, we can expect typical defensive or attacking chunks to be 
associated with reward or rejection. The purpose of emotional responses would be to 
draw the player’s attention towards possible dangers in the position. This emotional 
bias would contribute to the selection of an appropriate option: a kind of emotionally-
driven decision-orienting heuristic. As expertise develops, the alerting system made 
up of emotions tunes the emotional response for the chunks stored in LTM. In a later 
phase, the emotional system may code the emotional responses in reply to frequently-
encountered combinations of chunks. 
Simulations with the CHREST model 
Simulations with CHREST show that the theory accounts for a wide range of 
data, both quantitatively and qualitatively, on skilled and unskilled chess perception, 
mental imagery, learning and memory, including: eye movements during the 5-s 
presentation of a position; memory for game positions as well as positions randomised 
or modified in various ways; effect of presentation time (from 1 s to 60 s); and how 
novices acquire chunks and templates (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 1993; Gobet 
& Jackson, 2002; Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003; Waters & Gobet, in 
press).  When considering the simulations, the coverage is broader than that offered 
by the chunking theory, and, unlike the earlier computer model by Simon and 
Gilmartin (1973), CHREST actually carries out the selection of the chunks to learn, 
without the need of human supervision.  This is achieved by simulating eye 
movements even during the learning phase.   
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To illustrate further the way CHREST works, we describe simulations for 
three aspects of the theory that will play an important role in explaining intuition: 
template formation, eye movements, and dynamic character of the simulations. 
Template formation. 
Given the importance of templates in the theory, it is important to show that 
the mechanisms used lead to the formation of templates that are plausible.  Fig. 4 
shows a sample of templates that were created by CHREST.  For each position, the 
core of the template is shown by the pieces placed on the board; the slots for squares 
are indicated by a dot on the square, and the slots for pieces are indicated by the icons 
shown below each position.  Based on the joint judgement of the authors, who are 
both chess masters, these templates correspond reasonably well to typical chess 
positions.  Note that in these examples, templates are not only constructed for typical 
openings, but also for typical offensive or defensive set-ups in middle-game positions 
(e.g., first position in Fig. 4). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Eye movements. 
As we have seen in the description of eye fixations, one of CHREST’s 
attractive features is that its domain-specific knowledge is used to direct a large 
proportion of eye movements in the simulation of experts, but without using rules.  
This makes possible to simulate several key aspects of masters’ eye movements in 
chess.  De Groot and Gobet (1996) have shown that the program captures the main 
features of human behaviour: average duration of fixations, low variability in the 
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duration of fixations, proportion of the board covered, and proportion of the 
semantically-important squares covered.  For example, the average fixation duration 
is 272 ms (SD = 97 ms) for CHREST, which is in close agreement with the average 
duration of the human masters (260 ms; SD = 100 ms).  
Fig. 5a shows a typical master pattern of eye movements, for the position 
shown in Fig. 2, and Fig. 5b shows, for the same position, a typical run of CHREST.  
While the exact sequences of eye fixations differ—the sequences of eye movements 
also differ across human players of the same skill level—it is clear that the program 
reproduces the key features of the human pattern.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Time course of constructing the internal representation of a position.  
 A key assumption of CHREST is that there is a close interaction between 
STM and LTM.  This interaction is mainly made possible by three mechanisms.  First, 
when an LTM chunk is recognized, a pointer to this chunk is stored into STM.  
Second, the information in STM may be used for further learning.  Third, when a 
template is held in STM, information can rapidly be added to its slots.  Appendix 1 
illustrates some of these ideas with a detailed run of CHREST in a recall task, where 
the position is presented for five seconds; again, the position depicted in Fig. 2 is 
used.  
Intuition 
We are now in a position to discuss the contribution of the template theory to 
our understanding of intuition.  In this respect, the template theory shares several 
features with the chunking theory, including the assumption that intuition can be 
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largely explained by pattern recognition; that chunks, which are learnt implicitly, 
mediate pattern recognition; that chunks give access to information about what kinds 
of action can be executed; and that there is close interplay between pattern recognition 
and search, with the implication that intuition affects the entire decision process, not 
only its early phase.  In this respect, both theories agree with De Groot’s statement 
(1986, p. 70) that “… intuitive processing is omnipresent in human thinking.” 
There are also important differences between the old and new theory.  As we 
shall see in the next section, these novel features are crucial for explaining key aspects 
of intuition.  These include the presence of similarity links between nodes in the 
discrimination net; more complex data structures (templates) in LTM; and provision 
of mechanisms for incrementally creating templates and automatically linking actions 
to perceptual patterns.  In particular, the presence of templates enables internal 
representations of the environment to be constructed at a higher level of abstraction 
than assumed in the chunking theory, while still explaining the speed at which these 
representations are created.  Another important novel feature of the theory is that it 
closely links attention, perception, learning, and action, in that it proposes 
mechanisms showing how LTM knowledge—in this case, the structure of the 
discrimination net—directs eye movements; this provides a powerful explanation of 
why the key features in a scene are generally perceived rapidly by experts.  Finally, 
the extended theory accounts for how emotions affect cognition during learning and 
performance. 
How the New Theory Addresses the Issues Problematic for Dreyfus’s and 
Simon’s Theories 
 Our discussion of Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories has led to the identification 
of problems in both of them, problems that relate to deep issues in our understanding 
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of intuition.  If the extended template theory is a valid theory of intuition, it should be 
able to address these issues satisfactorily.  It is therefore important to review these 
questions from the point of view of template theory. 
Holistic vs. Local Processing 
Empirical data suggest that experts process information at various levels of 
granularity, including low-level features and high-level representations.  In particular, 
the recall of game and random chess positions has shed important light on this issue, 
and has direct relevance to the question as to whether intuition is always holistic in 
nature.  CHREST accounts for recall data obtained with brief presentation times, 
simulating data such as the percentage of correctly recalled pieces, the type and 
number of errors, as well as the size and number of chunks.  For example, the 
program replicates how players of different skill levels perform with presentation 
times ranging from 1 to 60 s, and in particular the rapid improvement shown by 
masters with game positions after 1 s (Gobet & Simon, 2000).  As noted by Gobet and 
Simon, this phenomenon is directly affected by the presence of templates, and in 
particular the assumption that encoding in the template slots is rapid once a template 
has been recognized (see also the discussion of the CHREST trace presented in the 
appendix).   
Another important result—directly addressing the issue of local processing—
is that CHREST also accounts for the small skill effect present in the recall of random 
positions.  While this effect is not as large as with game positions, it is reliable and 
has been replicated several times (Gobet & Simon, 1996a, 2000).  The program 
accounts for this effect by recognizing local patterns that show up serendipitously 
even in random positions.  The larger the discrimination net, the higher the probability 
of finding chunks for such patterns, hence the skill effect.  It is unclear how a holistic 
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theory such as Dreyfus’s can account for these data, as they seem to rely on 
processing local aspects of the positions.  In general, the pattern of eye movements 
during the 5-s presentation of a position also supports the hypothesis of a progressive 
and serial construction of an internal representation rather than holistic processing (De 
Groot & Gobet, 1996; Simon & Barenfeld, 1969).  Thus, the evidence seems to point 
to large, “holistic” representations being constructed by local mechanisms. 
From Abstract to Concrete? 
An important prediction of Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s theory (1988) is that, as 
novices become experts, there is a transition from analytic to intuitive, from abstract 
to concrete knowledge.  We have seen earlier that, at least in some domains of 
expertise and in some tasks, the opposite pattern is actually observed.  But this also 
seems to be a simplified picture.  As shown by research in domains such as chess (De 
Groot, 1965), physics (Larkin et al., 1980; Simon & Simon, 1978), and nursing 
(Benner, 1984; Gobet  & Chassy, in press), the pattern of learning is more complex 
and incorporates a progression from analytic to intuitive knowledge but also an 
increased ability to deal with abstractions.  Thus, an expert in physics will both 
recognize concrete patterns rapidly and understand the problems at a higher level of 
abstraction than a novice.  The template theory readily deals with the acquisition of 
different types of knowledge and representation (e.g., diagrammatic and algebraic), as 
has been discussed at length in the context of education (Gobet, 2005; Gobet & 
Wood, 1999).  The theory predicts that perceptual, schematic, and procedural as well 
as concrete and abstract knowledge are acquired in parallel, and thus that these types 
of knowledge should overlap with experts.   
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Analytic and Intuitive Behaviour 
Just like Simon’s theory, our theory has the advantage over Dreyfus’s that the 
links between intuition and slower problem solving behaviour are made explicit.  The 
key idea, already present in Simon’s earlier work and fully developed in Gobet 
(1997), is that problem solving involves cycles interleaving pattern recognition and 
search.  At the beginning, there is an attempt to access a chunk or a template in LTM.  
The more expert the individual, the more likely this will be successful.  If a chunk or a 
template is accessed, the information linked to it is used to carry out further searching 
of the problem, and this cycle continues. In cases where no chunk or template can be 
found, or where no information is associated to them, weaker heuristics are used, 
either domain-specific heuristics or domain-general heuristics such as means-end 
analysis.  When the problem is easy, the correct solution can be retrieved by LTM 
look-up.  
 As noted above, one of the objections filed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) to 
Simon’s idea of intuition as pattern recognition was that there was no explanation as 
to how a single action (a move, in the case of chess) could be chosen while several 
chunks could be identified.  The situation is actually worse, as a single chunk could 
propose several actions.  This is a standard issue with production systems, technically 
known as conflict resolution, and several solutions have been proposed (Neches, 
Langley, & Klahr, 1987; see also the description of CHUMP above).  
 Due to limits in existing technology in the sixties and seventies, Simon could 
not develop simulation programs able to show that such pattern-recognition 
mechanisms could indeed lead to the selection of a move and that the pattern-action 
pairs could be learned automatically.  As we have seen earlier, the CHUMP program 
(Gobet & Jansen, 1994) is doing just this for the domain of chess.  With respect to 
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intuition, it is of particular interest that this program performed better in situations 
requiring a “positional judgment” than in tactical positions, where look-ahead search 
becomes more critical.  Positional judgment in chess is often presented as a 
paradigmatic example of intuition, not only by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988), but also 
in the popular literature on chess (Kotov, 1971). 
The Problem of Small Chunks 
As noted above, two other objections to Simon’s theory are that the chunks 
identified by Chase and Simon (1973) for chess may be too small to elicit moves and 
that they do not capture the whole of the position.  The simulations carried out by 
Gobet and Jansen (1994) show that the first objection does not apply.  As to the 
second objection, there is indeed ample evidence that strong players use high-level 
representations at a more abstract level than the piece locations encoded by chunks 
and that, at least in some cases, they perceive the entire board as a single unit.  This 
evidence includes the analysis of verbal protocols in problem-solving tasks (De Groot, 
1965), recall tasks (De Groot, 1965; De Groot & Gobet, 1996), and classification 
tasks (Freyhoff, Gruber, & Ziegler, 1992).  As noted above, the template theory 
captures this aspect of expert perception in chess.  As a matter of fact, postulating 
structures that could potentially cover the entire problem situation and that have 
schema-like properties was one of the motivations behind the development of the 
template theory.  Although templates capture the “wholeness” of perception taken by 
Dreyfus to be a signature of expertise, their construction is incremental, with larger 
chunks being recursively produced by the conjunction of smaller chunks. 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have briefly considered the empirical data supporting the 
concept of intuition, before discussing two influential theories of intuition, that of 
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Hubert Dreyfus and that of Herbert Simon.  We have noted that, ironically, Dreyfus 
uses experts’ intuition as one of the main grounds for which information processing 
psychology (and classical artificial intelligence) is doomed to fail, ignoring empirical 
and theoretical work by Simon and others showing that simple information processing 
mechanisms might explain this phenomenon.  We have also noted that chess has often 
been used to illustrate the putative bankruptcy of rule-based and symbolic thinking.  
By contrast, the empirical evidence we have discussed has illustrated situations where 
these symbolic techniques do better than human intuition. 
 Our critical analysis of the two theories has established that, while both 
address important aspects of expert intuition, both fail to account for the empirical 
data thoroughly.  To address this theoretical gap, we have shown how the template 
theory, a modification of the chunking theory, accounts for most of the empirical data 
linked to intuition.  In addition to pattern recognition—already present in the 
chunking theory—the key mechanisms relate to the interaction between perception, 
attention, and learning, and to the creation and use of templates.  These schema-like 
structures enable information to be encoded both rapidly and at a high level of 
representation.  A further important addition consisted of mechanisms linking chunks 
and templates to emotions.   
 This paper has emphasised the differences between the three theories, but it is 
fair to acknowledge that they share a number of similarities: beyond accepting 
intuition as a genuine phenomenon, all three theories emphasise the essential role of 
perception, the fluid, automatised, and rapid behaviour characteristic of experts’ 
intuition, and the long time required to become an expert.  They also all stress the 
importance of discrimination and association in explaining experts’ behaviour, 
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although the holistic nature of these processes, essential in Dreyfus’s theory, is not 
shared by the other two theories. 
 The differences between the three theories have implications for practice and 
research.  The assumption that experts’ knowledge is composed of chunks, as opposed 
to Dreyfus’ assumption that it is holistic in nature, makes it possible to design 
curricula where the instructional material is decomposed into small bits and where 
computer-based tutors may be used (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 2000; Gobet & 
Wood, 1999).  Assuming that knowledge also consists of templates leads to 
considerations as to how schematic knowledge can be best acquired and taught 
(Gobet, 2005); for example, variety in the curriculum material is an essential 
requirement for making possible the acquisition of templates.  By contrast, an 
emphasis on the holistic nature of expertise, with the implication that experts’ 
understanding cannot by analysed into components, leads to different types of 
curricula, where engagement in real-life situations is emphasized.  The importance of 
such situation is of course not negated by chunk-based approaches, but seen as 
complementary to other instructional methods.  As for empirical research, the impact 
of the two approaches can readily be seen.  Traditional research on expertise has been 
largely motivated by Chase and Simon’s  (1973) chunking theory, and has been 
characterised by a substantial number of experimental and quantitative observational 
studies, and to a lesser extent computer models (for reviews, see Ericsson, Charness, 
Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006; Gobet, de Voogt, & Retschitzki, 2004).  Research on 
nursing expertise, perhaps the domain that has been most influenced by Dreyfus’ 
theory, is mostly made up of qualitative observational studies, of which many consist 
of phenomenological analysis (e.g., Benner, 1984; Benner et al., 1996), and 
quantitative approaches are explicitly considered suspicious (Benner, 1984). 
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 In sum, this paper has presented a new theory of intuition, part of which is 
formally expressed as a computer program.  We have argued that it accounts for all 
the phenomena taken as signatures of intuition.  Crucially, the new theory leads to the 
conclusion that, while aspects of expert intuition can be characterized as holistic, the 
mechanisms that lead to them are local. 
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Appendix 
Trace of CHREST in a memory recall task 
Fig. A1 illustrates the information held in CHREST’s STM during the five-
second presentation of a position (see Fig. 2) during a task, using the timing of the eye 
fixations as a clock.  Given the context of this paper, we are mostly interested in what 
happens at the beginning, and thus provide all the STM states during the first two 
seconds.  For each panel in the Fig., the first line shows the time at which the fixation 
was carried out, the following lines the state of STM (where #C means “chunk” and 
#T means “template”), and the diagram shows the pieces that would be replaced on 
the board if CHREST had to recall the position at this point.  The pieces or squares in 
grey indicate that this information has been encoded in the slot of a template.  The 
version of CHREST used in this simulation had 100,000 chunks, and is representative 
of a chess master. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. A1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
At 30 ms, no chunk has been encoded in STM.  At 240 ms, the program has 
recognized a medium-sized chunk, which happens to be a template.  It is a fairly 
common black castling constellation.  However, at this point, CHREST did not have 
the opportunity to encode anything in the template slots and used only the core of the 
template.  Note that the black bishop, the black knight, and one of the black pawns are 
incorrectly located.  This is due to the fact that CHREST enables some fuzziness in 
the way patterns are matched, the information used to sort to a given node not being 
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necessarily identical to the information stored at this node.11  At 490 ms, a second 
chunk has been recognized, and a template slot has also been filled (black bishop on 
c6). 
 At 750 ms, a second piece has been encoded in the template slots, and a third 
chunk has been recognized.  This new chunk does not add new information, as the 
three pieces were already encoded by the main template.  This is typical of the way 
CHREST works, where there is always the possibility that the information held in 
different chunks overlaps.  At 850 ms and 960 ms, no new information has been 
added.  At 1060 ms, the only progress is that the white pawn on c5 has been encoded 
in one of the template slots.  This illustrates that the program has a fair amount of 
redundancy, as this pawn is now encoded both in a chunk and in a template. 
 At 1350 ms, a larger chunk on the king’s side has been recognized, which 
correctly encodes the location of the black pawn on h6.  There is now uncertainty as 
to whether CHREST would now replace the pawn on h7 or h6, and this type of 
uncertainty with lateral pawns is typical of human behaviour (De Groot & Gobet, 
1996; Jongman, 1968).  Given that visual STM is limited to three items, this new 
chunk has dislodged the small chunk on the black queen’s side.  The black queen has 
now been encoded as well in the template.  At 1490 ms, the white knight on e5 has 
been encoded in the template, and at 1610 ms, the same happens to the black knight 
on f4.  It is interesting to note that, just like most of the masters studied by de Groot 
                                                 
11
 Technically, this is due to the way the mechanisms of discrimination (construction of the network) 
and familiarisation (building of the information held at a given node) work together. The possible 
discrepancy between the information used to reach a node and the information stored at this node offers 
an important means of simulating errors in chess (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 2000) and 
in verbal learning (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984). 
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and Gobet (1996), CHREST memorised the four perceptually salient pieces in the 
centre of the board (Pc5, Nd6, Ne5, and nf4). 
At 1740 ms and 1850 ms, CHREST has encoded that the squares e8 and d8 are 
empty.  This is not particularly useful for a recall task, but this is clearly something 
that chess masters occasionally do (De Groot & Gobet, 1996), as empty squares are 
important strategically (Holding, 1985; Reynolds, 1982; Tikhomirov & 
Poznyanskaya, 1966).  At 2100 ms, the program shows the same state of affairs. 
 We can now observe in a fast forward mode what happens during the last three 
seconds.  At 3110 ms, the program has recognized a medium-sized chunk on the 
white king’s side, which also happens to be a template.  The template has enabled the 
encoding of three white pieces.  The situation remains unchanged at 4000 ms and at 
4840 ms.  Thus, at the end of the presentation of the position, the program would 
replace 21 pieces correctly out of a total of 24 pieces.  Three pieces are missing (all on 
the “a” column), and three placements would be counted as errors of commission 
(black bishop on e7, black knight on f6, and black pawn on h7).  (While hesitating 
about the placement of a pawn or a piece, such as the black pawn h7/h6 in our 
example, humans either go for one location or replace both of them.)  This amount of 
recall is fairly consistent with what has been observed in the literature with strong 
masters (Gobet et al., 2004). 
 What this example illustrates is that CHREST incrementally constructs a 
representation of the position in memory, and that the access to templates seriously 
boosts its memory.  In particular, the recall performance would be fairly low without 
the possibility of encoding information in templates (that is, without the pieces on 
greyed squares).  This is consistent with what has been observed with human masters 
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when the presentation time ranges from one second to 60 seconds (Gobet & Simon, 
2000).   
 The astute reader may object that it is unclear how the program would see the 
checkmate threat (Qg5xg2; the queen is protected by the black bishop on c6 and the 
black knight on f4) within five seconds, given that the information on the white king’s 
side has been perceived fairly late, and no single chunk encodes both the black queen 
and the white king.  Interestingly, out of the four human masters whose behaviour is 
discussed in De Groot and Gobet (1996) with respect to this position, only one saw 
this threat.  Indeed, whereas masters reliably see threats when the attacking and 
attacked pieces are either close together or when one of the pieces is perceptually 
salient, as noted by Jongman (1968), the data of De Groot and Gobet (1996) clearly 
show that even “obvious” threats are often overlooked when these characteristics are 
lacking.  Thus, the detection of threats, which of course plays a key role in 
understanding the meaning of a position, does not always operate automatically.  In 
this respect, the trace produced by CHREST is consistent with the empirical data. 
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Figure captions 
Fig. 1. Illustration of how perceptual chunks can implement the notion of a 
production.  Patterns on the board (the circled groups of pieces) might elicit 
perceptual chunks in long-term memory, the condition part of the production.   
Some of these chunks (in this case the one elicited by the pattern on the lower 
right hand side of the board) might suggest possible moves, the action part of 
the production (here, the white bishop retreating to the square “f1” to parry the 
checkmate threat on “g2”).  Productions operate unconsciously and intuitively 
and, with strong players, may lead to actions that are readily solutions to a 
problem. 
Fig. 2. Overview of the key perceptual and memory mechanisms embodied in the 
template theory.  A simulated eye selects patterns on the external board.  
These patterns are sorted through a discrimination net, which enables access to 
a chunk (node) in long-term memory.  Chunks give access to diverse types of 
information in addition to the location of pieces (depicted in the Fig.), 
including, in the case of chess, what kinds of move should be played or what 
plan should be followed (additional information is not shown in the Fig.).  
Information accessed in long-term memory is then placed in short-term 
memory, which consists of a queue of chunks and a pictorial short-term 
memory, where visuo-spatial information can be unpacked. 
Fig. 3.  Illustration of the mechanism of template formation (Panel a, discrimination 
net; Panel b, representation of the piece location on the chessboard).  If a given 
type of information recurs often below a node in the discrimination network, a 
slot can be created at this node, specifying both the variable and the values 
that this variable can have.  For example, given that a white pawn is used in 
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three branches below the node depicted in grey, a slot can be created for 
“white pawn”, and the possible values for the squares on which the pawn can 
be located are “f2,” “e4,” and “d4.”  Similarly, a slot can be created for the 
square “e4,” which can have the value “black bishop” and “white pawn.” 
Chunks possessing slots are called templates. 
Fig. 4.  Sample of templates created by CHREST for chess. 
Fig. 5.  Pattern of eye movements for a chess master (top) and for a CHREST 
simulation (bottom).  The semantically important squares are displayed in 
grey. (After De Groot & Gobet, 1996.  Reproduced with permission of the 
copyright holder.) 
Fig. A1. The time course dynamics of STM during the 5-s viewing of a chess 
position, according to CHREST. 
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30 ms 
STM empty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
240 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
  
 
 
 
 
 
490 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C Pc5 pb5  
 
 
 
 
750 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
#C Pc5 pb5 
  
 
 
 
850 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
#C Pc5 pb5 
 
 
 
 
960 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
#C Pc5 pb5 
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1060 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
#C Pc5 pb5 
 
 
 
1350 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
 
 
 
1490 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1610 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
 
 
 
1740 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
 
 
 
1850 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#C pe6 pf7 bc6 
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2100 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C Pc5 pb5  
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
 
 
 
(…) 
3110 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#T Pf2 Pg2 Ph2 Kg1  
 
 
(…) 
4000 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#T Pf2 Pg2 Ph2 Kg1 
 
 
 
(…) 
4840 ms 
#T pe6 pf7 pg7 ph7 kg8 be7 nf6 rf8 
#C pe6 pf7 pg7 ph6 kg8  
#T Pf2 Pg2 Ph2 Kg1 
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